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I. Introduction 
An often overlooked aspect of labor and employment law is that such 
laws apply only where there is an employment relationship. However, this 
feature is not completely ignored, for any astute employer is well aware that 
classifying its workers as nonemployees means that it need not comply with 
many labor and employment laws, or payroll tax requirements. Despite— 
or perhaps because of—this significant effect, the struggle to distinguish 
employees from independent contractors and other nonemployees has been 
lengthy and confused.1  This confusion is unfortunate because it has 
provided many employers with the opportunity to manipulate certain 
aspects of individuals’ work for the sole or primary purpose of avoiding 
legal and tax liability.2 
Within the annals of this struggle to define who is a covered employee, 
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) holds a special place. As in 
other areas, the NLRA’s employee/independent contractor test has been a 
model for other statutes. But this model leaves much to be desired and is in 
desperate need of reform. 
Micah Jost, in his Note, Independent Contractors, Employees, and 
Entrepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-
Worker Approach,3  smartly explains the development of the NLRA’s 
definition of employee and the many problems it has engendered, 
∗ Associate Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law. 
1. See U.S. GOV’T ACC. OFFICE, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION: IMPROVED 
OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER CLASSIFICATION 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07859t.pdf [hereinafter EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION] 
(providing statistics on growing number of independent contractors in the workplace); Ruth 
Burdick, Principles of Agency Permit the NLRB to Consider Additional Factors of 
Entrepreneurial Independence and the Relative Dependence of Employees When 
Determining Independent Contractor Status Under Section 2(3), 15 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. 
L.J. 75, 79–125 (1997) (describing development of employee/independent contractor 
distinction). 
2. Burdick, supra note 1, at 81. 
3. See generally Micah Prieb Stoltzfus Jost, Independent Contractors, Employees, 
and Entrepreneurialism Under the National Labor Relations Act: A Worker-by-Worker 
Approach, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 311 (2011). 
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particularly in allowing employers to classify many workers as noncovered 
independent contractors despite the fact that a fair reading of the statute 
would consider them employees. He then turns his attention to a 
particularly disturbing new twist on this classification: The D.C. Circuit’s 
recent focus on the existence of entrepreneurial opportunity as the primary 
factor in determining employee status. As Jost describes, this approach 
flies in the face of a long history of common law and undermines the aims 
of the NLRA and other labor and employment laws. 
One suggestion Jost makes to correct the D.C. Circuit’s approach is to 
replace the court’s stress on theoretical entrepreneurial opportunity with 
actual opportunity, based on each individual worker’s experience. This 
change would certainly be an improvement, but as Jost acknowledges, more 
comprehensive reform would be even better. One significant change would 
be legislation that shifted the emphasis away from the traditional common 
law approach and towards a definition that focuses on the policies of the 
NLRA. Although this would disrupt the NLRA’s role as a template for 
other labor and employment laws—a role for which it has often been well 
suited—that minor disruption should not hinder an otherwise beneficial 
reform. The NLRA has unique attributes, and a definition of "employee" 
that took into account that reality would improve the statute’s ability to 
fulfill its aims. 
Alas, the prospect for legislative change is dismal, at least in the short-
term. Thus, it is imperative to consider what options, if any, exist for the 
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) to counter the D.C. 
Circuit’s recent moves. Because of the odd circumstances surrounding the 
development of the D.C. Circuit’s approach, it appears that the NLRB 
possesses several strategies that could shift the analysis back to the 
traditional position. This is not an ideal solution by any means, but one that 
would be a dramatic improvement over where the law is going now. 
II. Going Rogue: The D.C. Circuit’s Unique Entrepreneurial 
Opportunity Approach 
As Jost ably describes, the customary approach to distinguishing 
employees from independent contractors is a multi-factor common-law test. 
This test traditionally focused on an employer’s right to control the manner 
and means of work, although recent caselaw has taken a more equitable 
look at all of the factors.4  The D.C. Circuit, however, has taken this move 
4. See infra notes 14, 18–20 (citing cases which discuss the employee/independent 
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further and shifted the focus away from control to entrepreneurial 
opportunity. In doing so, it raised troubling questions not only for the 
future of the NLRA’s definition of employee, but also for the court’s 
deference to the NLRB. 
The D.C. Circuit most clearly stated its new approach in the case 
FedEx Home Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB,5  where the court held that "both this 
court and the Board, while retaining all of the common law factors, 
‘shift[ed the] emphasis’ away from the unwieldy control inquiry in favor of 
a more accurate proxy: whether the ‘putative independent contractors have 
significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’"6  This shift to 
entrepreneurial opportunity as the "animating principle" in the 
employee/independent contractor analysis—a shift that the court describes 
with unwarranted understatement as a "subtle refinement"7—is the result of 
an earlier D.C. Circuit decision, Corporate Express Delivery Systems v. 
NLRB.8  In that case, the court explicitly stated that the central focus of the 
employee/independent contractor inquiry has moved away from the control 
factor to whether the putative employees possess entrepreneurial 
opportunity.9  As Jost explains, this change is troubling for many reasons, 
not the least of which is that it allows employers more opportunity to 
exclude workers who would typically be considered employees by 
manipulating work relationships.10  A further disturbing aspect of the 
decision, however, is the manner in which the court arrives at this test. The 
court not only betrays a lack of concern for workers’ ability to enjoy the 
legal protections intended by the NLRA, but also a lack of respect for the 
NLRB’s administrative expertise and the long-standing precedent of the 
Board, Supreme Court, and the D.C. Circuit itself. 
In Corporate Express, the D.C. Circuit discussed the evolution of the 
common-law definition of employee and described the court’s shift to 
contractor test). 
5. See generally FedEx Home Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 
2009). 
6. Id. at 497 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Corp. Express Delivery Sys. 
v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). 
7. Id. 
8. See generally Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 
2002). 
9. See id. at 780 ("[W]e uphold . . . the . . . focus not upon the employer’s control of 
the means and manner of the work but instead upon whether the putative independent 
contractors have a ‘significant entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’"). 
10. Jost, supra note 3, at 347–48. 
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entrepreneurial opportunity.11  The first problem with this new test is that 
the court placed the change at the feet of the NLRB. Although the court 
stated that the Board had urged a focus on entrepreneurial opportunity,12  an 
examination of the Corporate Express litigation clearly shows that the 
Board urged no such thing. 
In the NLRB’s Corporate Express decision, entrepreneurial 
opportunity was certainly an important component of the case, but the 
Board explicitly relied on many of the traditional common-law factors.13 
Moreover, the Board’s decision never suggested that it was altering the 
employee/independent contractor analysis in any way, much less by making 
entrepreneurial opportunity the new focus. 
Given that the NLRB decision contains not even a hint of this shift, 
where does the court find evidence of the Board’s "urging?" The impetus 
for the court’s statement seems to be the NLRB’s appellate brief to the 
court, in which the General Counsel expressed concern about past D.C. 
Circuit decisions that seemed to place control over the manner and means 
of work above all other common-law factors.14  According to the General 
Counsel, the reliance on control was unable to capture the essence of 
employee status in many instances and was contradicted by recent Supreme 
Court decisions.15  The brief then gave examples—later repeated by the 
11. Corp. Express Delivery Sys., 292 F.3d at 779–81. 
12. See id. at 780 ("[W]e uphold as reasonable the Board’s decision, at the urging of 
the General Counsel, to focus not upon the employer’s control of the means and manner of 
the work but instead upon whether the putative independent contractors have a ‘significant 
entrepreneurial opportunity for gain or loss.’"). 
13. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys. & Teamsters Local 886, 332 N.L.R.B. 1522, 
1522 (2000) (listing factors considered by the Board). The ALJ’s recommended decision, 
which the court cited as its only piece of evidence of the "Board’s decision," also cited 
numerous common-law factors. Id. at 1526–27. 
14. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 37–38, Corp. Express Delivery 
Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1058), 2001 WL 36039100, at *37– 
38. This would be a fair reading of the court’s precedent, which itself is well justified, as the 
common law test had traditionally and explicitly focused on this factor—so much so that it is 
still often referred to as the "right-to-control" test. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. 
NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 779 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("In past cases we have treated ‘the amount of 
control that the company has over the way in which the worker performs his job’ as the most 
important among several elements useful in distinguishing an employee from an independent 
contractor." (citing C.C. Eastern, Inc. v. NLRB, 60 F.3d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1995), N. Am. 
Van Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 869 F.2d 596, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1989), Local 777, Democratic Union 
Org. Comm., Seafarers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 873 (D.C. Cir. 1978))). 
15. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 35–39, Corp. Express Delivery 
Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (No. 01-1058), 2001 WL 36039100, at *35– 
39. 
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court—in which placing control above all other factors might lead to a 
misclassification, including insurance "agents [who] do not operate their 
own independent businesses, but perform functions that are an essential part 
of the company’s normal operations,"16  and jobs such as cook or corporate 
executive, where workers "are regarded as employees even though virtually 
no control is exercised over the manner and means of their performance."17 
Thus, in Corporate Express, the D.C. Circuit fairly describes the 
Board as urging diminished reliance on control over the manner and means 
of work. But even the most charitable reading of Corporate Express cannot 
defend the claim that the NLRB sought more emphasis on entrepreneurial 
opportunity. Indeed, the General Counsel explicitly urged not that 
entrepreneurial opportunity replace the court’s focus on control, but instead 
that the court heed the Supreme Court, which "has repeatedly emphasized, 
[that] all incidents of the work relationship must be considered and ‘[n]o 
one of these factors is determinative.’"18  According to the General Counsel, 
the test should not focus on any one factor because various factors can have 
more or less relevance depending on a particular factual situation. 
Consequently, the General Counsel’s central request was that "we 
respectfully urge the Court to reexamine its precedent in light of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions . . . and to give appropriate weight to all of the 
factors in the common-law agency test."19  Given this unequivocal 
argument, it is a mystery how the court characterized the Board’s position 
as favoring entrepreneurial opportunity above all other factors. 
Aside from this inaccuracy, the D.C. Circuit’s Corporate Express test 
raises a more serious problem: It directly contradicts Supreme Court 
precedent. As the Court has made clear on several occasions—and as the 
NLRB specifically described in its brief to the D.C. Circuit—when a 
statute’s definition of "employee" is amorphous, Congress is presumed to 
have sought the common-law test and all of its nondispositive factors.20 
This statutory interpretation rule unquestionably applies to the NLRA, as 
the Court made clear in NLRB v. United Insurance.21  Thus, even if the D.C. 
16. Id. at *38 (quoting NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254, 257 (1968)). 
17. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) cmt. d (1958)). 
18. Id. (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 518, 324 (1992); Cmty. 
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 752 (1989); United Ins., 390 U.S. at 258). 
19. Id. at *39 (emphasis added). 
20. Id. at *18–21 (citing Darden, 503 U.S. at 324; Reid, 490 U.S. at 752 n.31); see 
also Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 326 N.L.R.B. 842, 848–50 (1998) (discussing Darden, 
Reid, and the Restatement (Second) of Agency). 
21. See United Ins., 390 U.S. at 256 ("[T]here is no doubt that we should apply the 
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Circuit was correct in Corporate Express that the NLRB wanted to place 
entrepreneurial opportunity above all other factors, the court should have 
rejected that position as inconsistent with United Insurance and other 
Supreme Court decisions. 
A further problem with Corporate Express is the D.C. Circuit’s 
inconsistent deference to the NLRB. Indeed, the irony is that the D.C. 
Circuit exhibited both too much and too little deference to the Board. 
Initially, even ignoring the fact that the Board’s purported new 
position was inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, the court 
exhibited too much deference in Corporate Express. If the NLRB had, in 
fact, applied a new test that placed entrepreneurial opportunity above all 
other factors, there are at least two basic rules of administrative law that 
should have led the D.C. Circuit to reject that position. 
First, under the Chenery doctrine, a court is not permitted to enforce an 
agency decision on grounds that the agency did not rely upon.22  The D.C. 
Circuit is well aware of this doctrine, which it has frequently cited as a 
basis to deny enforcement of NLRB orders.23  The purported new position 
of the General Counsel is a perfect example of a Chenery violation. The 
NLRB decision made no mention of any shift in position and instead relied 
on a variety of relevant common-law factors. If the General Counsel tried 
to defend that decision on the grounds that entrepreneurial opportunity was 
the dispositive or most important factor, then the rationale of Chenery—that 
reliance on reasoning not contained in an administrative decision is unfair 
to the parties and deprives the court of an adequate basis upon which to 
review the decision24—would be violated. In short, the D.C. Circuit should 
not have allowed the NLRB’s agency counsel to make an argument that the 
agency itself did not make. 
common-law agency test here in distinguishing an employee from an independent 
contractor."). 
22. See Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 196 
(1947) (stating the rule that "a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment 
which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of 
such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency"); Sec. & Exchange Comm’n v. 
Chenery (Chenery I), 318 U.S. 80, 94–95 (1943) (same). See generally Mathew Ginsburg, 
"A Nigh Endless Game of Battledore and Shuttlecock": The D.C. Circuit’s Misuse of 
Chenery Remands in NLRB Cases, 86 NEB. L. REV. 595 (2008); Kevin M. Stack, The 
Constitutional Foundation of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007). 
23. See, e.g., Point Park Univ. v. NLRB, 457 F.3d 42, 50–51 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ("We 
can only look to the Board’s stated rationale. We cannot sustain its action on some other 
basis the Board did not mention." (citing Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 196–97)). 
24. Chenery I, 318 U.S. at 94–95. 
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Second, even if Chenery had been satisfied by an explicit shift in the 
NLRB’s employee/independent contractor analysis, administrative law 
would still require the court to refuse to enforce the change in Corporate 
Express. A change in agency policy must be accompanied by an 
explanation of why the change was made.25  This is another basic rule that 
the D.C. Circuit has cited frequently in rejecting NLRB decisions.26  Even if 
one could divine an attempt to change the employee/independent contractor 
analysis in the NLRB’s Corporate Express decision, there is nothing 
resembling an explanation for such a change and the court should have 
refused to enforce the new analysis. 
After giving the NLRB’s ostensibly new rule far more deference than 
warranted, the D.C. Circuit then did something curious: It refused to defer 
to the agency’s desire to return to its previous rule. Despite laying the shift 
to entrepreneurial opportunity at the feet of the Board in Corporate 
Express, the court in FedEx Home Delivery rejected the Board’s subsequent 
argument that entrepreneurial opportunity should be but one of many 
factors; the court explained the rejection by citing its own Corporate 
Express holding as "binding," even though it was based on a now-
abandoned agency pronouncement.27  If the court believed that the Board 
had the power to shift the test once, why did it refuse to allow the agency to 
shift it back—or at least explain why it believed such a shift was 
improper?28  In essence, the court modified a test purportedly based on 
25. See, e.g., NLRB v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438, 443 (1965) (noting that the 
Board "must disclose the basis of its order and give clear indication that it has exercised the 
discretion with which Congress has empowered it" (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Point Park, 457 F.3d at 49 ("[W]here a party makes a significant showing that analogous 
cases have been decided differently, the agency must do more than simply ignore that 
argument." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
26. See, e.g., Point Park, 457 F.3d at 49 (noting that the Board must provide a 
"fulsome explanation" when deciding a case differently from precedent cited by an 
aggrieved party); Palace Sports & Entm’t, Inc. v. NLRB, 411 F.3d 212, 225 (2005) 
(requiring that the Board "explain the precise reasoning on which it means to rest its 
conclusion"). 
27. FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
28. It is true that the NLRB, perhaps not anticipating the court’s enshrinement of the 
entrepreneurial opportunity test, did not emphasize that its analysis differed from what the 
court held in Corporate Express. However, the Board’s appellate brief described Corporate 
Express as holding merely that entrepreneurial opportunity was a "significant factor" in the 
analysis and that no one factor is decisive—not that entrepreneurial opportunity was the 
overriding focus. Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 33, FedEx Home 
Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Nos. 07-1391, 07-1436), 2008 WL 
4425831, at *33. Moreover, the court in FedEx Home Delivery implicitly recognized the 
tension between its precedent and that of the Board, as it acknowledged that the "struggle to 
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agency deference, but then enshrined that test as the court’s own precedent, 
thereby barring further agency reconsideration of the issue. A court with 
the D.C. Circuit’s administrative law expertise certainly knows that this is 
improper.29  What is unfortunate is that this selective deference is an all too 
common problem for the NLRB, which often must fight a lack of respect 
for its conclusions, unless they mirror what certain courts already believe to 
be the correct answer.30  This is not what judicial review of agencies is 
supposed to look like. 
Moving beyond the issue of judicial disrespect, the larger question is 
whether the NLRB, assuming that it still objects to the entrepreneurial 
opportunity analysis, can do anything about the specific 
employee/independent contractor problem in the D.C. Circuit.31  There are 
both pessimistic and optimistic views of the Board’s options to counteract 
this seemingly enshrined precedent. 
On the pessimistic side, it is never a good thing when an appellate 
court creates a standard with which the Board disagrees. This is 
particularly true of the D.C. Circuit, which is widely respected among other 
circuits for its expertise in labor and other administrative law.32  Other 
capture and articulate what is meant by abstractions like ‘independence’ and ‘control’ also 
seems to play a part in the Board’s own cases, though we readily concede the Board’s 
language has not been as unambiguous as this court’s binding statement in Corporate 
Express." FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 498. 
29. See Corp. Express Delivery Sys. v. NLRB, 292 F.3d 777, 780 (D.C. Cir. 2002) 
(holding that the standard of review for the employee/independent contractor analysis 
required the court to "uphold the Board if it can be said to have made a choice between two 
fairly conflicting views" (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). There are 
questions whether this less deferential standard of review, based on the Supreme Court’s 
United Insurance decision, is appropriate, as most employee/independent contractor 
decisions are highly fact dependent—a determination that is usually afforded significant 
deference by courts. See Burdick, supra note 1, at 121–25 (noting also that NLRB 
determinations of other types of "employees" under the NLRA already receive the typical, 
higher level of deference). 
30. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Defending the NLRB: Improving the Agency’s Success in 
the Federal Courts of Appeal, __ FIU L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 3), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1660215 [hereinafter Hirsch, Defending the NLRB] ("Judges often 
seem not to respect the Board or, at a minimum, have no hesitation reversing a decision with 
which they have the slightest disagreement.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
31. FedEx Home Delivery, 563 F.3d at 498, reh’g en banc denied (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
32. Norman J. Fry, The Decontextualization of Labor Relations in Successorship 
Cases: Williams Enterprises v. NLRB and Sullivan Industries v. NLRB, 61 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1616, 1662–63 (1993) ("[T]he D.C. Circuit’s unique position as the preeminent court 
of appeals with respect to federal labor law gives its opinions special influence among the 
other circuits and the district courts." (citations omitted)). 
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circuits, therefore, are likely to follow the D.C. Circuit’s lead. Moreover, 
the combination of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisdiction over all NLRB cases, no 
matter where the facts took place, 33  and the Board’s policy of giving losing 
parties the first opportunity to file a judicial challenge,34  gives every 
employer the ability to bring an employee/independent contractor case to 
the D.C. Circuit. This means that the entrepreneurial opportunity test, even 
if it does not spread to other circuits, will be very difficult for the Board to 
avoid. 
On the optimistic side, it is not certain that other courts will follow the 
D.C. Circuit. If the Board thoroughly explains why it refuses to follow the 
Corporate Express test, some courts may take notice.35  For instance, all 
five other circuits that recently addressed whether the NLRB had authority 
to issue decisions with only two members disagreed with the D.C. Circuit’s 
holding that such authority was lacking.36  However, this tactic, even if 
successful, has a limited appeal because of employers’ ability to go to the 
D.C. Circuit whenever they wish.37 
Ironically, the best option for the NLRB may be the D.C. Circuit itself. 
Although the court rejected the NLRB’s petition for an en banc hearing in 
FedEx Home Delivery, the Board has another option that may prove more 
successful.38  If the Board issues a decision that explicitly rejects the 
33. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (2006). 
34. See Hirsch, Defending the NLRB, supra note 30, at 22 (noting that the Board waits 
thirty days to seek enforcement of an order in a court of appeals, providing the losing party 
with the first chance to file an appeal). 
35. The NLRB, like other agencies, at times refuses to follow a certain court’s holding 
under a "nonacquiesence policy." See generally Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, 
Nonacquiesence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989). 
36. Of course, the D.C. Circuit’s take on this issue ultimately won in the Supreme 
Court. See New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S.Ct. 2635, 2638 (2010) (holding that the 
NLRB lacked authority to issue two-member decisions). This holding upheld the conclusion 
of the D.C. Circuit, and reversed the other five circuits that considered the issue and came to 
the opposite result. Compare Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc., v. NLRB, 564 
F.3d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that the NLRB does not have authority to issue two-
member decisions), with Ne. Land Servs., Ltd. v. NLRB, 560 F.3d 36, 40–42 (1st Cir. 2009) 
(holding that NLRB does have authority to issue two-member decisions), Snell Island SNF 
LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410, 414–24 (2d Cir. 2009) (same), New Process Steel v. NLRB, 
564 F.3d 840, 848 (7th Cir. 2009) (same), Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, 590 
F.3d 849, 850–52 (10th Cir. 2009) (same), and Narricot Indus., L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654, 
658–60 (4th Cir. 2009) (same). 
37. See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text (noting the D.C. Circuit’s 
jurisdiction over all NLRB appeals as well as the Board’s policy of allowing losing parties to 
choose where to file a challenge). 
38. See supra note 31 (noting the D.C. Circuit’s denial of a rehearing en banc). 
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entrepreneurial opportunity analysis and thoroughly explains its position, 
the D.C. Circuit may be receptive. Even a three-member panel of the court 
could enforce the Board’s "new" position—all without expressly criticizing 
the court’s previous decisions in Corporate Express and FedEx Home 
Delivery. In other words, the Board can treat those decisions as merely 
approving the agency’s own test.39  That position does not accurately 
describe what happened, but it is how the D.C. Circuit characterized the 
rule’s development. Taking the court’s cases at face value would allow the 
Board to change the central issue to whether its new test—employing all of 
the common-law factors equally—is reasonable. There are already a 
substantial number of D.C. Circuit judges who appear sympathetic to that 
view,40  and others may be swayed by the court’s deference to reasonable 
agency pronouncements. By playing the D.C. Circuit at its own game, the 
NLRB could take the initiative and force the court to evaluate the 
traditional test on its merits, rather than directly fighting a new 
entrepreneurial opportunity test that the Board never wanted in the first 
place, but with which the court seems enamored. 
III. Who Are You?: Classifying Employees Under the NLRA 
The distressing aspect of the previous section is that it merely raises 
the hope that the Board can return the D.C. Circuit back to the status quo— 
a status quo, as Jost demonstrates, that ill serves the policies of the NLRA.41  
A more hopeful inquiry is whether there is anything that could be done to 
improve the current state of the law. 
Jost describes several reform proposals that attempt to expand the 
definition of a covered employee through different means, including 
creating a new "dependent contractor category,"42  focusing on a worker’s 
39. See supra note 29 (discussing the deference courts owe the NLRB). 
40. See supra note 31 (observing that five judges voted to rehear FedEx Home 
Delivery en banc). 
41. See Jost, supra note 3, at 333–35 ("[C]urrent doctrine . . . leads scholars . . . to lay 
aside the policies and purposes behind collective bargaining legislation."). 
42. Id. at 27 (citing St. Joseph News-Press and Teamsters Union Local 460, 345 
N.L.R.B. 474, 486 (2005) (Member Liebman, dissenting); MARC LINDER, THE EMPLOYMENT 
RELATIONSHIP IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 240 (1989); Brian A. 
Langille & Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from 
Canada, 21 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 7, 22–29 (1999)); Elizabeth Kennedy, Comment, 
Freedom from Independence: Collective Bargaining Rights for "Dependent Contractors", 
26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 143, 148 (2005). 
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economic dependency upon a putative employer,43  focusing on the amount 
of specialized labor that the worker brings to the relationship,44  and creating 
a rule that would cover nearly all workers.45  These alternatives all have 
their merits, yet the more conservative proposals—those that attempt to 
work within the current law, such as adding economic dependency to the 
common law test—are unlikely to make any real strides in expanding the 
definition of employee.46  To be sure, some marginal cases would turn on 
these variations, but it is likely that these tests would lead most 
adjudicators, whether the NLRB or the judiciary, to continue classifying 
workers in much the same way that they do now. What is needed, 
therefore, is a more fundamental change in the definition of employee. 
The major difficulty in discussing such a change is that the current 
political climate makes statutory reform a nonstarter.47  That said, as Jost 
43. Id. at 48–50 (citing St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. at 484 (Member 
Liebman, dissenting); Burdick, supra note 1, at 129–31; Charles B. Craver, The National 
Labor Relations Act Must Be Revised to Preserve Industrial Democracy, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 
397, 417 (1992)); Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the Contingent Work Force, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 750 (1995); see also Guy Davidov, Who is a Worker?, 34 
INDUS. L.J. 57, 62–63 (2005) (arguing for intermediate category of covered workers who are 
classified as such based on their dependence and subordination). 
44. See Jost, supra note 3, at 338–39 (citing Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 
1529, 1539–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Michael C. Harper, Defining 
the Economic Relationship Appropriate for Collective Bargaining, 39 B.C. L. REV. 329, 341 
(1998)). 
45. Id. at 29 (citing Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent 
U.S. Labor Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 
21 COMP. LAB. L. POL’Y J. 187, 223 (1999)); Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for 
Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers Without Workplaces and Employees 
Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 283 (2006); cf. Brishen Rogers, 
Toward Third-Party Liability for Wage Theft, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 4 (2010) 
(arguing for liability under the Fair Labor Standards Act to rely on a firm’s duty of 
reasonable care to ensure compliance throughout its supply chain, rather than a worker’s 
status as an employee of the firm). 
46. See, e.g., St. Joseph News-Press, 345 N.L.R.B. at 484 (Member Liebman, 
dissenting) (arguing that "economic dependence is a relevant factor in determining employee 
status under the National Labor Relations Act" under current law); Burdick, supra note 1, at 
125 (same). Of course, the value of these proposals is that they have a more realistic chance 
of becoming a reality; thus, any criticism leveled here at the proposals’ limits is directed at 
the need to substantially change the status quo, not at others’ recognition that modest reform 
is likely all that is possible given the current political environment. Supra note 47 and 
accompanying text. 
47. See Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA?, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 262, 265–66 (2008) (explaining why the NLRA has not been amended 
substantially in decades); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1530–31 (2002) (same). 
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explains, the only genuine hope for meaningful reform is legislation or the 
Supreme Court’s abandoning its refusal to provide the NLRB more leeway 
48 in interpreting the NLRA’s incredibly vague definition of employee. 
Thus, any examination of genuine reform in this area must include some 
level of wishful thinking. 
Whether through legislation or a newly liberated Board policy, there 
are numerous ways to modify the employee/independent contractor 
analysis.49  However, meaningful reform could be achieved with less 
radical change; indeed, some simple tweaks to the current analysis could 
make a major difference. In particular, a multi-factored analysis that uses 
the policies of the NLRA as its focus would cover more intended 
beneficiaries of the NLRA’s protections and would decrease employers’ 
ability to abuse the classification analysis. 
Any new analysis must maintain some form of multi-factored test to 
be effective. One fault of the D.C. Circuit’s test, and by implication Jost’s 
suggestion that an actual entrepreneurial opportunity test would be a 
suitable replacement, is that it is too simplistic.50  Although I typically 
sympathize with attempts to simplify rules, at times the ideal can be the 
enemy of the good. The employee/independent contractor issue provides a 
perfect illustration of this limitation, as there are so many idiosyncratic 
factual elements to each case that it is impossible to create a simple rule that 
achieves the desired result in every instance.51  Instead, the myriad types of 
work relationships that exist require an analysis that incorporates an equally 
multi-dimensional approach.52  Although a test relying on many factors 
often fails to provide clarity to parties,53  this is a necessary evil given the 
48. Jost, supra note 3, at 333–35. 
49. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text (discussing proposals for reform). 
50. Jost attempts to work within the current legal limits by recommending a test that 
focuses on an individual’s actual entrepreneurial opportunity. Jost, supra note 3, at 342–51; 
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) 
(defining employee as a worker who does not render services as an "independent business"). 
However, Jost also recognizes that a wider focus is ideal. See Jost, supra note 3, at 335 ("As 
long as the Board and the courts claim to be able to distill the fundamental nature of worker 
classifications into one—or even several—common law factors, the resulting arbitrary tests 
will continue to provide protections and rights which do not match the needs of modern 
workers."). 
51. See Jost, supra note 3, at 318–19 (discussing inconsistent outcomes in different 
factual circumstances). 
52. See Burdick, supra note 1, at 129 ("Relevant facts indicating entrepreneurial 
independence . . . will vary from case to case depending on the exact circumstances of each 
work arrangement . . . ."). 
53. See Harper, supra note 44, at 337–38 (criticizing multi-factor test that is not 
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complexities of the workforce. However, it is also an evil that the NLRB is 
well used to dealing with.54 
Although the multitude of factors should remain, a shift in focus 
should occur. This change, which would require legislative action or new 
Supreme Court law,55  would explicitly make the NLRA’s policies the 
primary consideration in the employee/independent contractor analysis. 
Such a focus has been suggested by some as an appropriate addition to the 
Fair Labor Standards Act’s economic dependence test,56  but the NLRA’s 
uniquely broad aims justify an even more substantial focus on policy.57 
The NLRA explicitly states that its aims are to equalize bargaining 
power between employees and employers, and to support industrial peace 
through collective bargaining.58 	A policy-based approach to the 
employee/independent contractor analysis, therefore, would use multiple 
factors to determine whether using an employee classification would 
promote these goals.59  A central question typically would be whether 
grounded in a policy goals); Linder, supra note 45, at 199–201 (criticizing lack of policy 
considerations in NLRA employee/independent contractor analysis); Rogers, supra note 45, 
at 4 & n.5 (discussing multi-factor tests which provide "a quagmire of factors, the 
significance of which eludes [courts] because they do not understand what the factors [are] 
used to gauge" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
54. As Jost notes, the NLRB regularly applies a similarly complex multi-factored test 
to determine whether a worker is an excluded supervisor. Jost, supra note 3, at 350–51. 
Supervisor classification disputes require consideration of factors similar to employee 
classification disputes, such as the nature of an employer’s operations, policies regarding 
workers’ role in the business, and actual experiences with the workers in question. See 29 
U.S.C. § 152(11) (2006) (defining "supervisor" through multi-factored test). See generally 
Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006). 
55. See Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325 (1992) (rejecting an 
"emphasis on construing th[e] term ["employee"] in the light of the mischief to be corrected 
and the end to be attained" (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
56. Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1543–45 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, 
J., concurring). 
57. See Harper, supra note 44, at 341 (arguing that the NLRA multi-factor test must 
fall under its policy goal of allowing "those who combine their labor with traditional, 
nonhuman capital provided by others to bargain collectively with such providers for a 
division of the returns from the combination"). Jost makes a similar point in his observation 
that most proposals to reform this area are based on "the simple assertion that the decision 
should be made based on economic and social policy—not the common law." Jost, supra 
note 3, at 340–41. The argument here, however, is somewhat narrower in that I argue that 
the policy upon which the employee/independent contractor decision should be based is tied 
expressly, and solely, to the purposes of the NLRA. 
58. 29 U.S.C. § 151. 
59. See Linder, supra note 45, at 187–88 (arguing for analysis based on NLRA 
policies). 
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classifying a group of workers as employees would create a unit that could 
engage in effective collective bargaining with the employer, especially in a 
manner that would give the workers more power vis á vis the employer.60 
For instance, a group of workers who perform services for various firms, 
largely determine their own work schedules, and control their manner of 
work would—aside from compensation—have little to discuss during 
bargaining with a firm. In contrast, workers who lack such control over 
their work and who work primarily for a specific firm over a long period of 
time could achieve substantial benefits from collective bargaining. 
Another issue that is generally ignored in the employee/independent 
contractor analysis, but is worthy of inclusion, is whether the employer’s 
classification makes sense from an operational standpoint. In other words, 
when an employer argues that workers are independent contractors, does 
that classification fit the workers’ role within the firm or does it merely 
represent an employer’s attempt to exclude individuals from coverage 
under labor and other laws even though they provide the firm benefits 
typical of employees? The current analysis too often allows employers to 
gain all the benefits of independent contractor status with few if any of the 
costs. Instead, employers should be explicitly forced to accept the costs 
that are usually associated with independent contractors. For example, if 
FedEx wants its drivers to be independent contractors, then it should not be 
allowed to gain the benefits associated with drivers who are identified 
solely as representatives of FedEx and who must strictly comply with 
FedEx’s comprehensive rules about customer service. Instead, if FedEx 
wants to treat its drivers like individuals who are in business for 
themselves, then it should accept having its packages delivered by non-
FedEx identified businesses. 
IV. Conclusion 
In his Note, Jost addresses an increasingly problematic aspect of 
NLRA law: The ability and willingness of employers to exclude workers 
from coverage under the statute by classifying them as independent 
contractors. This problem has existed since the early days of the NLRA, 
but is worsening as a result of changes in the modern workplace.61  Adding 
60. Id. at 201 ("As long as employers control the working conditions that workers 
want improved, why should it matter whether they tell them how to work?"). 
61. See generally KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004) (discussing changes in the workplace, 
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fuel to this fire, and creating the impetus for Jost’s Note, is the D.C. 
Circuit’s new test that makes mere entrepreneurial opportunity the 
cornerstone of the employee/independent contractor analysis. This test 
defies both well-established precedent and the policies of the NLRA. 
Accordingly, the first order of business is to somehow reverse a test that 
makes one long for the far-from-perfect common-law analysis. 
As Jost demonstrates, the common-law analysis—although superior to 
the D.C. Circuit’s formulation—is in dire need of reform itself. Ideally, this 
reform would be substantial, either through legislation or a new willingness 
by the Supreme Court to abandon a strict compliance with the common-law 
analysis. The result would hopefully produce a more flexible, policy-
oriented definition of employee that—especially in combination with 
increased audits and penalties for misclassification, as well as more 
attempts to provide workers with the information and tools needed to 
challenge misclassifications62—would better capture the type of employees 
that the NLRA was intended to cover. Only through such a change will the 
NLRA maintain relevance for a growing number of workers who look like 
employees but are now treated as independent contractors by their 
employers. 
such as more telecommuting and other work relationships where workers are separated 
geographically from their employer). 
62. For example, several recently proposed bills would have, among other reforms, 
amended the Internal Revenue Code to provide notice to workers of a new right to challenge 
their employer’s classification and the legal ramifications of that classification. Fair Playing 
Field Act of 2010, S. 3786, 111th Cong. (2010); Employee Misclassification Prevention Act, 
S. 3254, 111th Cong. (2010); Independent Contractor Proper Classification Act of 2007, S. 
2044, 110th Cong. (2007) (introduced by then-Senator Barack Obama). Moreover, the 
Government Accountability Office has recommended a notice posting and that the 
Department of Labor refer possible misclassification cases to other, relevant agencies. 
EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
